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1. Introduction 
 
Superior or command responsibility 1 is the primary mechanism through which superiors 
can be held criminally responsible for failing to prevent or punish crimes committed by 
their subordinates. The concept is an important tool in punishing those in superior 
positions for lack of supervision over persons under their command or authority. It 
extends to military and non-military (political, civilian) superiors. This liability theory 
was already described by Hugo Grotius when he wrote, “we must accept the principle that 
he who knows of a crime, and is able and bound to prevent it but fails to do so, himself 
commits a crime”.2 In one sentence Grotius captured the essence of superior 
responsibility. 
 Prior to the Second World War, superior responsibility was an articulation of 
military practice. 3 This accounts for the term command responsibility. A posit ion of 
command generally imposed military-disciplinary responsibility 4, only in a few cases did 
it entail criminal liability. 5 International adjudication in the twentieth century, in 
                                                 
∗ Professor of Criminal Law, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. The author wishes to thank Chantal Meloni who 
played an essential role in draft ing this chapter. All mistakes remain the author’s. 
1 Command responsibility and superior responsibility are used here as interchangeable concepts.  
2 H. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1615), Book II (ed. F.W. Kelsey c.s, New York/London, Oceana 
Publications Wildy & Son 1964), p. 523. 
3 For a historical overview, see W.H. Parks, 'Command Responsibility for War Crimes', 62 Military Law Review 
(1973), p. 1-20; L.C. Green, 'Command Responsibility in International Humanitarian law', 5 Transnational Law 
& Contemporary Problems (1995), p. 320 - 327; I. Bantekas, Principles of direct and superior responsibility in 
international humanitarian law (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), p. 67 - 70. 
4 Some trace it back to what they refer to as 'the oldest military treatise in the world', written in 500 B.C. by Sun 
Tzu: S. Tzu, The Art of War  (ed. S.B. Griffith, Oxford 1963), p. 125. 
5 For an early example see Parks who refers to the trial o f Peter Hagenbach in 1474 who was brought to trial 
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particular after the Second World War, has developed superior responsibility into a 
concept of criminal responsibility. It was the Second World War and its aftermath that 
generated the leading cases on superior responsibility. 6 In these cases the first contours of 
a modern concept of superior responsibility were drawn.7  
 The ICTY built on this legacy. The leading case is the Prosecutor v. Mucić et al, 
also referred to as the Čelebići case after the camp where the crimes were committed. 8 Two 
of the accused, Delić and Landzo, in their respective positions as deputy commander and 
guard, were found guilty as being personally responsible for their direct participation in the 
crimes against detainees. On the other hand, Mucić, the commander of the camp, was found 
guilty for crimes committed by his subordinates by virtue of his position as the de facto 
commander of the camp. The Judgment in the Čelebići case was the first extensively 
reasoned decision on command responsibility by an international tribunal after Nuremberg 
and Tokyo. It was also the first command responsibility case before the ICTY. Until then 
the accused were charged and convicted for direct participation in crimes under article 
7(1) of the Statute. The Trial Chamber in Čelebići formulated three elements that should be 
met before one can be held liable as a superior under article 7(3) of the Statute. 9 Proof is 
required of, (i) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship; (ii) that the superior 
knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to or had committed a crime; 
and (iii) that the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent 
the criminal act or to punish the perpetrator thereof. 10 In Orić, the Trial Chamber added a 
                                                                                                                                                        
by the Archduke of Austria fo r murder, rape, perjury and other crimes. Hagenbach was t ried by an 
internat ional tribunal composed of judges from the allied states of the Holy Roman Empire. He was 
convicted o f crimes which he, as a kn ight, should have p revented as he had had the duty to do so. Parks, 
supra note 3, p . 4-5. 
6 U.S. v. Tomoyuki Yamashita, Trials of War Criminals (TWC), Vol. IV, p. 3 - 4; U.S. v. Yamashita, 327 US 1.;  
S. v. Von Leeb (High Command case) in Friedman (1972) Vol. II, p. 1421 - 1470; TWC, Vol. XI, p. 462 - 697; 
U.S. v. Wilhelm von List et al. (Hostages case) in Friedman (1972) Vol. II, p. 1303 - 1343;. TWC, Vol. XI, p. 
1230 - 1319  
7 See E. van Sliedregt, The criminal responsibility of individuals for violations of international humanitarian law 
(Cambridge/ The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2003), p. 119 - 135. 
8 Judgment, Delalić et al. (IT-96-21-T), Trial Chamber, 16 November 1998 (hereinafter Čelebići Judgment); 
Delalić et al, (IT-96-21-A), Appeals Chamber, 20 February 2001 (hereinafter Čelebići Appeal Judgment) For 
comments on the Čelebići case see infra I. Bantekas, ‘The contemporary law of superior responsibility, 93 
American Journal of International Law (1999), p. 573 - 595; M. Lippman, The Evolution and Scope of 
Command Responsibility, 13 Leiden Journal of International Law (2000), p. 139 - 170; Commentary on the 
Čelebići Judgment by Harmen van der Wilt in A.H. Klip and G.K. Slu iter, Annotated Leading Cases of 
International Criminal Tribunals, Vol. 3 ICTY 1997-1999 (Antwerpen, Groningen, Oxford: Intersentia/Hart, p. 
669 - 683. 
9 Art 7(3) ICTY Statute reads: “The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 o f the present Statute 
was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason 
to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the 
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.” 
10 Čelebići Judgment, supra note 8, para. 346, confirmed in appeal; Čelebići Appeal Judgment, supra note 8, 
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fourth element; (iv) a subordinate commits a crime under international law. 11 
 These elements reflect the basis of the concept of command responsibility as 
developed in post-Second World War case law and encapsulated in article 86 of Additional 
Protocol I (AP I) to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Since the Čelebići Trial Chamber’s 
findings on command responsibility have been endorsed in appeal and repeatedly confirmed 
by ICTY and ICTR Trial Chambers, the groundwork and underlying principles of this 
doctrine are firmly established in the Tribunals’ case law.   
 
Still, some critical aspects of the command responsibility doctrine remain indeterminate. Two 
reasons account for this. First of all, the complex nature of the concept; command 
responsibility is a multilayered concept that has traits of a separate offence - a failure to act - 
and of a mode of liability, a form of participation in subordinate wrongdoing. So far, ICTY 
case law does not provide for a uniform and unambiguous determination of what the nature of 
command responsibility is. Secondly, in more recent rulings the ICTY has moved away from 
some of the (implicit) findings in its earlier case law. This is the result of tailoring command 
responsibility to a new class of defendants who, compared to the first generation of ICTY 
defendants, can be referred to as the ‘big(ger) fry’ and who are generally far removed from 
the scene of the crimes and the perpetrators.  
 While the ground work has been laid in Čelebići, command responsibility has 
developed further. The question then is: what is the current scope and meaning of command 
responsibility in ICTY case law? Moreover, how does it relate to customary international law, 
national and international statutory and case law, and general principles of criminal law? The 
aim of this paper is to answer these questions by uncovering the nature of command 
responsibility in the law of the ICTY. Determining the nature of command responsibility will 
shed light on the outer limits of this liability theory; limits that seem to have expanded 
considerably in recent case law. 
 A lot has been written on command responsibility.12 This contribution will not go into 
all the aspects of this liability theory, nor will it discuss the concept in great detail. It will 
reflect on 15 years of ICTY case law and by necessity remain at a relatively general level.  
 The chapter starts with an analysis of how command responsibility developed beyond 
                                                                                                                                                        
paras. 189 - 198, 225 - 226, 238 - 239, 256, 263.  
11 Judgment, Orić, Trial Chamber (IT-03-68), 30 June 2006 (hereinafter Orić Judgment), para. 294. 
12 Only recently three doctoral dissertations were published on command responsibility: G. Mettraux, The Law of 
Command Resposnibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009; Ch. Meloni, Command responsibility in 
International Criminal Law, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2010; L. Nybondas, Command Responsibility and 
its Applicability to Civilian Superiors, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2010. 
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the Čelebići case (§2). The analysis focuses on the temporal scope of command responsibility, 
discussing the case law with regard to ‘successor superior responsibility’ (§2.1)13. The 
analysis continues with describing how the scope of article 7(3) has been extended in recent 
case law by adopting a broad interpretation of the terms ‘commission’ and ‘subordinate’ 
(§2.2). The latter development, raises the question as to the limits of command responsibility, 
which brings us back to the question of the nature of command responsibility: what is a 
superior actually held responsible for?(§3) To answer the latter question command 
responsibility outside the ICTY context will be analysed (§4), in international criminal law, 
most particularly the ICC Statute (§4.1) and national law (§4.2). Discussing command 
responsibility in national and international criminal law enables us to reflect on its layered 
structure (§5). Moreover, it assists in understanding the nature of command responsibility at 
the ICTY (§6) and in suggesting limits to its scope (§ 7).  
 
 
2. Command Responsibility beyond the Čelebići case 
 
Analysis of ICTY case law on command responsibility shows that we can detect a division 
into first, second and third generation cases. The first generation case law concerns the 
detention camp cases and the land mark ruling in Čelebići. The second generation case law 
emerges with the ruling in Hadžihasanović & Kubura (hereinafter Hadžihasanović) on 
successor superior responsibility.14 Since the latter decision two views of command 
responsibility can be identified: command responsibility as mode of liability and command 
responsibility as separate offence, as a failure to act. 15 The linkage between superiors and 
culpable subordinates has been gradually loosened in what can be regarded third generation 
cases, starting with Blagojević and Orić. These are cases of more senior defendants and of 
operational commanders - commanders in the field - who are often further removed from 
the scene of the crimes than the superiors that stood trial in the early cases such as 
                                                 
13 Term taken from Barrie Sanders who wrote an excellent paper on the issue: B. Sanders, ‘Unraveling the 
Confusion Concerning Successor Responsibility in the ICTY jurisprudence’, 23 Leiden Journal of International 
Law (2010), p. 105 - 135. 
14 Decis ion on Jo int  Challenge to Ju risdict ion , Hadžihasanović & Kubura (IT-01-47-AR72), Appeals 
Chamber, 16 Ju ly 2003 (hereinafter Hadžihasanović  Appeal Decision).  
15 The fact that these views emerged relatively late into the ICTY’s existence is because command responsibility 
as a liability theory was for a long time ignored by the prosecutor who favoured Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) 
as a basis of liability. This had to do with the fact that command responsibility, certain ly in early cases, has been  
regarded as narrowly defined, requiring a close link between superiors and subordinates, which was unappealing 
for a prosecutor seeking to secure convictions 
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Čelebići.  
 The overview of ICTY case law that follows is limited to second and third 
generation case law. We will start by discussing the divisive Hadžihasanović ruling on 
successor superior responsibility. 
 
2.1 Successor Superior Responsibility 
  
On the basis of superior responsibility we punish inactivity. 16 Thus, with superior 
responsibility a military or non-military superior is held responsible for a failure to act. 
This failure can consist of two scenarios: (i) the superior knew, or has reason to know, 
that crimes were about to be committed and failed to prevent such crimes, or (ii) the 
superior did not know of crimes being committed (and cannot be blamed for that lack of 
knowledge) but once informed failed to punish and/or report such crimes to the proper 
authorit ies. In other words, there is a pre-crime and a post-crime scenario of superior 
responsibility. It follows from the decision by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in 
Hadžihasanov ić 17 that the post-crime scenario only generates superior responsibility when 
it can be established that there was a superior-subordinate relationship governed by 
effective control at the time of the offence. 18 The Appeals Chamber found that since there 
was no effective control at the time of the offence, there was no criminal liability for these 
crimes under Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute. It was held that customary international 
law, the text of Article 7(3) of the Statute and the provision from which it stems, article 
86(2) of API, militate against extending liability to the post-crime scenario without the 
temporal coincidence. Thus, commander Kubura, who had taken up the position of 
commander on 1 April 1992, was not criminally liable for crimes committed by his 
subordinates in January 1992 because he had no effective control over his subordinates at 
the time, i.e. he could not have prevented the crimes. Kubura could not be held liable for 
past crimes even though he did not punish subordinates once he learnt fro the crimes. The 
Appeals Chamber reversed the decision of the Trial Chamber, which had accepted 
successor superior responsibility for Kubura.19  
                                                 
16 Thus, an act such as ordering crimes does not generate superior responsibility. An act of ordering can be 
prosecuted under a separate mode of liab ility, namely ‘ordering’ or ‘instigation’ (art. 6(1)/7(1) ICTR/Y St.)) o r 
‘ordering, solicit ing or inducing’ (art. 25(3)(b) ICCSt.).  
17 Hadžihasanović  Appeal Decision, supra note 14, para 51. 
18 Ibidem.  
19 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović and Kubura , Decis ion on Jo int Challenge to  Ju risdict ion , IT-01-47- 
(hereinafter Hadžihasanović decision, 21 February 2003. 
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 The Hadžihasanović Appeals Chamber was strongly divided. Judges Shahabuddeen 
and Hunt wrote vigorous dissents. 20 Shahabuddeen accepted the argument of the majority that 
so far there had been no reported cases in which command responsibility had been extended 
to acts of subordinates before the commander assumed command. Yet, he was of the view 
that this does not mean that the principle of command responsibility as established in 
customary international law, does not extend to successor superior responsibility. In his view 
the text of Article 7(3) allows for such an interpretation. He regards command responsibility 
as a failure to act rather than as a mode of liability. 
 
I prefer to interpret the provision as making the commander guilty for failing in his supervisory capacity to take 
the necessary corrective action after he knows or has reason to know that his subordinate was about to commit 
the act or had done so. Reading the provision reasonably it could not have been designed to make the 
commander a party to the particular crime committed by his subordinate.21  
 
Judge Hunt argued along similar lines. He pointed out that the specific factual situation in 
Hadžihasanović falls under the principle of command responsibility and that successor 
superior responsibility may, therefore, be regarded as part of customary international law.22 
He further relied on a purposive reading of article 86(2) of API to argue that post-crime 
command responsibility without temporal coincidence falls under articles 86(2) API and 7(3) 
of the Statute. As to the nature of command responsibility he found that, 
 
[t]he criminal responsibility of the superior is not a direct responsibility for the acts of the subordinate. It is a 
responsibility for his own acts (or, rather omissions) in failing to prevent or to punish the subordinate when he 
knew or had reason to know that he was about to commit acts amounting to a war crime or had done so.23 
 
In the Orić case the Appeals Chamber came close to revisiting the Hadžihasanović Appeal 
Decision. While the majority eventually declined to address the ratio decidendi of that 
decision, Judge Shahabuddeen, appended a declaration to reiterate his disagreement with the 
Hadžihasanović Appeal Decision. By restating his previous (dissenting) position in the 
Hadžihasanović case, he expressed the view that a commander can be criminally liable for 
crimes committed by subordinates before he assumed command. He went as far as 
discrediting the Hadžihasanović findings by claiming that “there is [now] a new majority of 
                                                 
20 Hadžihasanović  Appeal Decision, supra note 14, para. 51.  
21 Part ial Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, para. 32. 
22 Ibidem, para. 37. 
23 Separate and partially dissenting opinion of Judge David Hunt, para. 9. 
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appellate thought”. Yet, at the same time, however, he considered that “a reversal should 
await such time when a more solid majority shares the views of those two judges (referring to 
Judges Schomburg and Liu who were the minority in the Orić Appeal Judgment, EvS)”. In the 
meantime “the decision in the Hadzihasanovic case continues to stand as part of the law of 
the Tribunal”.24  
 One wonders why Shahabuddeen felt the need to make this point. It only creates 
uncertainty as to the scope of command responsibility in ICTY law; a Trial Chamber is bound 
to follow the Hadžihasanović appellate decision in the knowledge that a new majority has 
come into being which would adopt an opposite conclusion and accept successor superior 
responsibility. 25    
 
2.2 Broadening the scope of Article 7(3) of the Statute 
 
While the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s findings regarding successor superior responsibility that 
limit the scope of command responsibility, at least temporally, ICTY case law regarding the 
interpretation of the term ‘commission’ and ‘subordinate’ in Article 7(3) have considerably 
broadened the scope of command responsibility. 
 
2.2.1 The meaning of ‘commission’ 
To hold a superior responsible under the doctrine of command responsibility requires proof of 
the commission of a crime by perpetrators who are linked to the superior by a superior-
subordinate relationship. This requirement is firmly established in ICTY case law26, which 
explains why the ad hoc Tribunals often fail to elaborate on this specific point. As was stated 
by the Trial Chamber in Orić, “until recently, both the requirement of a principal crime 
(committed by others than the accused) and its performance in any of the modes of liability 
provided for in article 7(1) appeared so obvious as to hardly need to be explicitly stated”.27 
 This changed with the Blagojević ruling. ‘Commission’ in article 7(3) has been 
interpreted as encompassing all modes of participation listed in article 7(1): planning, 
                                                 
24  Judgment, Orić (IT-03-68-A), Appeals Chamber, 3 July 2008, Declarat ion of Judge Shahabuddeen, para. 15. 
See also the Partially dissenting opinion and declaration of Judge Liu and the Separate and partially dissenting 
opinion of Judge Schomburg, which were appended to the same Judgment.  
25 See Sanders, supra note 13, p. 121 - 122. 
26 For the express recognition see, Judgment, Blaskic (IT-95-14), Trial Chamber, 3 March  2000 (hereinafter 
Blaskić Judgment) para. 291; ICTR Judgment, Kayishema  & Ruzindana (ICTR-95-1), Trial Chamber, 21 May 
1999, paras. 476 - 516, 555, 559, 563, 569. 
27 Orić Judgment, supra note 11, para. 295. 
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ordering, instigating, and aiding and abetting crimes.28 The Appeals Chamber held that “[t]he 
meaning of ‘commit’, as used in article 7(3) of the Statute, necessarily tracks the term’s 
broader and more ordinary meaning, as employed in Protocol I”29. In Orić the appellate 
judges held that “a superior can be held criminally responsible for his subordinates’ planning, 
instigating, ordering, committing or otherwise aiding and abetting a crime”.30 The position 
that superior responsibility covers all subordinates’ criminal conduct falling under article 7(1) 
has also been adopted by the ICTR31.  
 A further question is whether a superior can be held criminally liable for the crimes 
that his subordinates, in turn, failed to prevent or punish. In other words, does ‘commission’ 
in article 7(3) extend to superior responsibility and alongside 7(1) also encompass 7(3) 
liability? In other words, ‘superior responsibility for superior responsibility’ or ‘multiple 
superior responsibility’.32  Orić was convicted on the basis of superior responsibility for the 
failure to prevent the cruel treatment and murder of Serb detainees at the detention facility of 
Sebrenica. His subordinate Krdzic was the commander of the Srebrenica military police yet 
no evidence was found that the perpetrators of the murders and cruel treatment were members 
of the military police.33 These crimes were committed by ‘opportunistic visitors’. The military 
police, however, being the detaining force assumed all duties and responsibilities under 
international law with regard to the treatment of prisoners and in particular was “bound to 
ensure that the detainees were not subject to any kind of violence to life and person”.34 For 
that reason, the Trial Chamber held that the Military Police “through its commanders....are 
(sic) responsible for the acts and omissions by the guards at the Srebrenica police station and 
at the Building”.35 Without stating it expressly, the Trial Chamber, by affirming the 
responsibility of Orić for the murder and cruel treatment of Serb detainees at the detention 
facilities in Sebrenica, seemed to have established liability on the basis of multiple superior 
responsibility.  
 The Appeals Chamber did not accept the Trial Chamber’s ruling on this point since it 
was not made clear on which basis Orić’ subordinate Krdzic was liable. The appellate judges 
                                                 
28 Blagojevic (IT-02-60-A), Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 9 May 2007,para 277-285, (hereinafter Blagojević 
Appeal Judgment); See Orić Judgment, supra note 24, para. 20;Boškoski & Tarčulovski (IT-04-82-T), Judgment, 
Trial Chamber, 10 July 2008, para 404. 
29 Blagojevic Appeal Judgment, supra note 28, para. 281 - 282. 
30 Orić Appeal Judgment, supra note 24, para. 21. 
31 See Nahimana et al. (ICTR-96-11), Judgment, Trial Chamber, 3 December 2003, para. 485 et seq. 
32 See E. van Sliedregt, ‘Art icle 28 of the ICC Statute: Mode of Liability and/or Separate Offense, 12 New 
Criminal Law Review (2009), p. 427. 
33 Orić  Judgment, supra note 11, para. 489. 
34 Ibid., para. 490. 
35 Ibid. 
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held that: “[t]he Trial Chamber in its legal findings did not consider whether a superior could 
possibly be held responsible under article 7(3) in relation to his subordinate’s criminal 
responsibility under the same article.36” This ruling leaves undisturbed the (implicit) 
acceptance by the Trial Chamber of multiple superior responsibility.  
 Multiple superior responsibility implies a remote link to the perpetrators. In the view 
of the Appeals Chamber judges in Orić, this in itself is irrelevant as long as there is “effective 
control”, i.e. the material ability to prevent the crime or punish, over the subordinate. The 
appellate judges held that it does not matter “whether the effective control descends from the 
superior to the subordinate culpable of the crime through intermediary subordinates”37. It was 
felt that whether the superior indeed possesses effective control is a matter of evidence and 
not one of substantive law. 38 
 In the Karadzić indictment, the ICTY Prosecutor charged the latter for crimes on 
the basis of multiple superior responsibility. 39 The Prosecutor has taken the Appeals 
Chamber’s words in Orić to heart and explicit ly charged Karadzić on the basis of article 
7(3) for crimes committed by subordinates, who are themselves liable under article 7(3).40  
  
2.2.2 The meaning of ‘subordinate’   
By now it is accepted in ICTY case law that the direct perpetrator does not have to be a 
subordinate of the superior. In the words of the Trial Chamber in Orić:  
 
The direct perpetrators of a crime punishable under the Statute (do not need to) be identical to the subordinates 
of a superior. It is only required that the relevant subordinates, by their own acts or omissions, be criminally 
responsible for the acts and omissions of the direct perpetrators.41 
 
In at least two cases before the ICTY the question arose whether a superior can be held 
responsible for acts of ‘unidentified’ subordinates. The judges in Hadžihasanović held that 
in establishing the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship, it is important to be 
able to identify the alleged perpetrators. This does not mean that the perpetrator needs to 
be identified exactly. It is sufficient to specify to which group the perpetrator belonged to 
                                                 
36 Orić  Appeal Judgment, supra note 24, para. 39. 
37 Ibid., para. 20 et seq. In the view of the Appeals Chamber the link of the accused to the crime was remote. It 
held that the Trial Chamber failed to establish the level of control, if any, that the accused exercised over the 
principal perpetrators. 
38  Ibid. 
39 Karadzic (IT-95-5/18-PT) Third Amended Indictment, para. 35.  
40 See for further elaboration on superior responsibility for superior responsibility Meloni, supra note 12. 
41 Orić  Judgment, supra note 11, para. 478. 
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and to prove that the accused exercised effective control over that group.42  
 The Trial Chamber in Orić went one step further when it held that a superior may be 
held liable for crimes committed by ‘anonymous’ persons. This ruling was, however, 
quashed on appeal mainly because it was found that the Trial Chamber had failed to 
determine that Orić knew or had reason to know that crimes had been or were about to be 
committed. With regard to the only subordinate that was identified, the Appeals Chamber 
held that the failure to determine on which basis the subordinate was found responsible, 
invalidated the conviction of Orić as a superior. 43  
 Taken together this means that a superior can be liable for crimes committed by an 
anonymous perpetrator as long as the perpetrator can be identified by his/her affiliation to 
a group/unit, there is effective control over the subordinate(s), and it is clear on which 
basis the latter is (are) responsible for such crimes. 
 
2.3 Observations  
 
The appellate decision in Hadžihasanov ić with regard to successor superior responsibility 
affirmed existing ICTY case law on command responsibility. Successor superior 
responsibility stands at odds with first generation ICTY jurisprudence. Applying the prevent 
and punish scenarios to different superiors would have countered findings with regard to the 
constitutive elements identified in Čelebići, most notably the requirement of proof of a 
superior-subordinate relationship that is governed by effective control. Requiring temporal 
coincidence of effective control, as the Appeals Chamber in Hadžihasanović did, was 
fully in line with the Čelebići Judgment.44 It is also in conformity with the finding in 
Kunarac that,  
 
[t]o be held liable for the acts of men who operated under him on an ad hoc or temporary basis, it must be 
shown that, at the time when the acts charged in the Indictment were committed, these persons were under the 
effect ive contro l of that particular ind ividual. 45 
 
The Hadžihasanović Trial Chamber and the two dissenting appellate judges Hunt and 
                                                 
42 Judgment, Hadžihasanović & Kubura (IT-01-47-T), Trial Chamber, 15 March 2006, para.90. 
43  See Orić Appeal Judgment, supra 24, para. 47. 
44 Ruling that there should be “[e]ffective control over the persons committing the underlying violations of 
international humanitarian law Čelebići Judgment, para. 378, endorsed in Čelebići Appeal Judgment, paras. 
256, and 265-266, supra note 8. 
45 Kunarac Judgment, para. 399. 
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Shahabuddeen accepted successor superior responsibility by adopting a ‘separate offence 
interpretation’ of article 7(3) of the Statute. However, it is highly doubtful whether such an 
interpretation actually ‘fits’ the text of the Statute and the ICTY sentencing practice. 
Command responsibility is framed as a corollary of subordinate liability. Consider the  
wording of article 7(3):  
 
[t]he fact that any of the facts referred to in Art icles 2 to 5 of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate 
does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was 
about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures 
to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof [italics added, EvS]. 
 
The connection between a culpable subordinate and a culpable superior as a result of the same 
crime suggests that the superior is responsible for the crime committed by the subordinate(s) 
and should be punished for it. Moreover, in Čelebići, the Appeals Chamber rejected a 
‘separate offence interpretation’ of Article 7(3) with regard to knowledge element (the duty 
to know). 
 
Article 7(3) of the Statute is concerned with superio r responsibility arising from failu re to act  in spite o f 
knowledge. Neglect of duty to acquire such knowledge, however, does not feature in the provis ion as a 
separate offence (...)46 
 
Similar reasoning can be followed with regard to the failure to punish; it does not feature 
as a separate offence in the text of Article 7(3). In this context we are reminded of article 
87 of API that encapsulates the duty of commanders and as such constitutes the basis of 
article 86 of API. It reads that 
 
The High Contracting Part ies and the Parties to the conflict shall require military commanders, with respect to 
members of the armed forces under their command and other persons under their control, to prevent and, where 
necessary, to suppress and to report to competent authorities breaches of the Conventions and of this Protocol. 
 
The wording, especially the clause ‘where necessary’ suggests that the primary task of a 
commander is to prevent violations of the laws of war. The duty to suppress and report are 
subsidary and seem concomitant to that primary task. This is confirmed by the 
authoritative Commentary to Article 87, which makes clear that the delegations when 
                                                 
46 Čelebići Appeal Judgment, para. 226. 
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drafting this provision were hesitant to accept this semi-prosecutorial function of military 
commanders. 47 Article 7(3), which closely resembles article 86 and which is directly based 
on it, may be seen to encapsulate this same ‘hierarchy of duties’. Command responsibility 
is the corollary of such a duty and it is, therefore, highly debatable that a separate ‘failure 
to punish/report’ can be read into article 7(3).  
 Accepting that article 7(3), at least by adopting a strict textual approach, does not 
include successor superior responsibility does not necessarily mean that a successor-
superior would go unpunished. A successor superior who does not punish or report 
subordinates to the proper authorities can still be liable under a military law or disciplinary 
framework. This comes with the unity of command; subordinate conduct is covered by 
‘responsible command’ at all times.48 Thus, when Judge Shahabuddeen argues in favour of 
successor superior responsibility and refers to the “gap in the line of responsibilities” that 
would otherwise exist, the response would be that such a gap does not exist when one looks to 
the military justice and disciplinary framework that governs a superior’s responsibility at the 
national level.49  
   
There are three reasons to be critical of the broadening of article 7(3) through the 
interpretation of ‘commission’ and ‘subordinate’ in article 7(3) and to the extent that it may 
include multiple superior responsibility. First of all, as pointed out by Mettraux, the position 
of the ICTY in Blagojević and Orić finds little or no support in relevant legal instruments 
(e.g. article 86 of Additional Protocol I, ILC draft codes, article 28 of the ICC Statute, the UN 
Darfur Report) 50 and state practice. 51 All well-known precedents, such as the Yamashita case, 
the Pohl case and the Hostages and High Command cases, relate to the responsibility of 
superiors for crimes that were committed by their own/direct subordinates as principal 
                                                 
47 ICRC, Commentary to the Protocol addit ional to the Geneva Convent ions of 12 August 1949 (Protoco l I)’, 
Article 87, para. 3562. See also customary internat ional humanitarian law database, Rule 153, p . 562-563 
with reference to the Blaskić Judgment, para. 709. 
48 As the Čelebići Appeals Chamber ruled  with  regard to a neg lect o f a  duty to know: “It  is however noted 
that although a commander’s failu re to remain appraised of h is subordinates’ action , o r to set up a 
monito ring system may constitute a neg lect o f duty which results in liab ility with in the military d iscip linary 
framework, it  will not necessarily result in  criminal liab ility”. 
Čelebići Appeal Judgment, supra note 8, para. 226. 
49 An example is article 41 of the German Military Criminal Code (MCC) stipulating that a commander is 
punished for failing to supervise or properly delegate supervision over his subordinates, which results in grave 
consequences such as ‘unlawful subordinate behaviour’. The German Code of Crimes against International Law  
(CCAIL) provides for command responsibility as a violation of a  duty to supervise Article 1 para. 13) and/or 
report crimes  in Art icle 1 para. 14.  Section 5 of the Canadian Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act 
and Section 9(2) of the Dutch International Crimes Act encapsulate command responsibility as a separate 
offence; a crime of negligence. 
50 See Mettraux, supra note 12, p. 135.  
51 Ibidem. 
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perpetrators. 52 Secondly, and this is related to what was said earlier on successor superior 
responsibility, the wording of article 7(3) implies a close link between a superior and 
subordinate wrongdoing. 53 Accepting command responsibility for crimes perpetrated by 
unidentified individuals sits awkward with the text of 7(3). This is particularly the case 
with multiple superior responsibility as charged recently in the Karadzić case. The third 
and probably most fundamental reason to be critical, can be found in the principle of 
personal/individual culpability. Through superior responsibility wrongdoing of a 
subordinate is imputed to the superior. This construction complies with the principle of 
personal culpability as long as there is reprehensible conduct on the side of the superior 
that can be linked to the subordinate’s crimes. In the language of the ICTY Statute this 
means that the superior has failed his/her duty to either prevent an imminent crime or to 
punish a subordinate who has committed a crimes. Omission liability, a type of liability 
that by nature is difficult to circumscribe, as a subordinate’s liability that may trigger 
command responsibility implies a weak link to the underlying offence. Needless to say this 
is even more so with multiple superior responsibility. Particularly, the latter can be 
regarded as a concept that stands at odds with the principle of culpability. 
 
Exploring the limits of command responsibility, inevitably requires understanding its 
nature. What exactly is a superior blamed for when he/she is held liable on the basis of 
command responsibility? This seems a straightforward question to which there must be a 
straightforward answer. Not so, as the following makes clear. 
 
 
3. The Nature of Command Responsibility in ICTY law 
 
The debate on the nature of command responsibility – is it a mode of liability or a separate 
offence - was triggered by the Hadžihasanović interlocutory decision. Yet, to date there is 
ambiguity as to what command responsibility at the ICTY really means. 
 One indication of what the nature of command responsibility at the ICTY is, can be 
found in the charges and the sentencing. Pursuant to article 7(3) the superior is held 
responsible for the same crime as his subordinate, which would qualify command 
responsibility as a mode of liability. In more recent case law, however, doubts have arisen 
                                                 
52 Ibidem, p. 135 - 136.  
53 Van Sliedregt, supra note 7, section 5(iii)(b). 
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as to the meaning of the expression “responsible for the crimes of his subordinates”. In the 
Halilović case the Trial Chamber interpreted ‘responsible for’ as an expression that “[d]oes 
not mean that the commanders shares the same responsibility as the subordinates who 
committed the crimes, but rather that….the commander should bear responsibility for his 
failure to act”. 54 In Orić, the superior was found to be responsible “merely for his neglect of 
duty with regard to crimes committed by subordinates”. 55 The accused was, therefore, found 
guilty not of the crimes committed by his subordinates (murder and cruel treatment) but of 
“failure to discharge his duty as a superior”. 56 With this change in ICTY jurisprudence, comes 
a change in formulation. The superior is not “responsible for” but “responsible in respect of” 
or “with regard to” the crimes of subordinates. These pronouncements, however, have not 
affected sentencing practice; superiors are still convicted of the underlying/base crime. 57 
 This changed with the Hadžihasanović Trial Chamber Judgment. The chamber 
found the accused guilty solely on the basis of superior responsibility. In determining the 
sentence the Trial Chamber held that superior responsibility pursuant to article 7(3) ICTY St 
is a type of liability that is distinct from that defined in article 7(1)ICTY St. A commander 
who has failed to ensure that his troops respect international humanitarian law is held 
criminally responsible for his own omissions rather than for the crimes result ing from 
them. Such a superior cannot be regarded as participating in the commission of the 
material elements of the subordinates’ crimes. Moreover, he lacks the requisite intent in 
respect of these crimes. Hence, such responsibility carries a lower sentence than if the 
superior was found to have participated in a crime pursuant to article 7(1) ICTY St.  
 The findings of the Hadžihasanović Trial Chamber on the nature of superior 
responsibility were not explicitly rejected on appeal. However, the Appeals Chamber 
repeated the Čelebići Appeals Chamber’s finding that, when assessing the gravity of a 
crime in the context of a conviction under Article 7(3), two matters must be taken into 
account: 
 
                                                 
54 Judgment, Halilovic (IT-01-48-T), Trial Chamber, 16 November 2005, para. 54. For a similar approach see 
Hadžihasanović Judgment, paras 74 -75. See also Appeals Chamber in Krnojelac: “It cannot be 
overemphasised that, where responsibility is concerned, an accused is not charged with the crimes of his 
subordinates but with his failure to carry out his duty as a superior to exercise control”. Judgment, Krnojelac 
(IT-97-25-A), Appeals Chamber, 17 September 2003, para. 171 (hereinafter Krnojelac Appeal Judgment). 
55 Orić Judgment, supra note 11, paras. 292-293.. 
56 See The Prosecution’s Appeal Brief, Orić (IT-03-68-A), para. 152. 
57 See however an interesting analysis on sentencing at the ICTY which found that sentences under article 7(3) 
are generally lower than under 7(1), B. Hola, A.L. Smeulers, & C.C.J.H. Bijleveld, Is ICTY Sentencing 
predictable? An Empirical analysis of ICTY Sentencing Pract ice’, Leiden Journalof International Law, 22(1) 
(2009), p. 79-97 
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(i) the gravity  o f the underlying  crime committed by  the convicted person’s subord inate;  and  
(2) the grav ity of the convicted person’s own conduct in failing to prevent or punish the underly ing 
crimes 58 
 
By emphasizing that the two conditions are cumulative, the Appeals Chamber confirmed 
that superior responsibility at the ICTY is more than a superior’s failure to prevent or 
punish; it extends to subordinate wrongdoing as well. Whether the superior is actually 
blamed for that conduct, in the sense that it is attributed to him, or whether the 
subordinate’s crime is merely a point of reference in sentencing, is not clear.    
 The most recurrent characterization of superior responsibility in ICTY case law is that 
of a “sui generis responsibility for failure to act”59, a formula that has the value of clarifying 
that superior responsibility under article 7(3) is distinct from the modes of liability under 7(1). 
Still, it does not elucidate the nature or type of superior responsibility. At best, one could say 
that superior responsibility is recognised as a hybrid form of liability, combining aspects of a 
mode of liability and a separate offence liability. This, however, is unsatisfactory. The 
meaning of the constitutive elements of superior responsibility and terms, such as 
‘commission’ and ‘subordinate’ in Article 7(3), hinge upon how one views superior 
responsibility. 60 The superior-subordinate relationship can be less proximate when superior 
responsibility is regarded as a separate offence where the sentence/punishment is not also 
based on the underlying crime. In other words, with a separate offence interpretation one can 
afford to loosen the linkage between superiors and subordinates and adjust the sentence 
accordingly. The problem with the above-discussed broadening of superior responsibility in 
third generation case- law is that the linkage to subordinate wrongdoing has been loosened 
while punishment is (still) based on it. 
 
 
4. Command Responsibility beyond the ICTY  
 
In pursuing the quest of understanding the nature of command responsibility at the ICTY, and 
hence pronounce on its scope and outer limits, it is instructive to look at command 
responsibility beyond the ICTY framework. Superior responsibility can take many shapes 
                                                 
58 Judgment, Hadžihasanović & Kubura , (IT-47-A), 22 April 2008, paras. 312 – 318 (hereinafter 
Hadžihasanović Appeal Judgment), para. 313 referring to  Čelebići  Appeal Judgment, para. 313. 
59 Hadžihasanović Appeal Judgment , supra note 58, paras 312-318. 
60 For a full elaboration on the subject, Meloni, supra note 12. 
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and forms.  
 
4.1  International Law 
 
The Statutes of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Law on the Establishment 
of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) provide for superior 
responsibility in a similar way as the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR do. The concept is 
framed as a corollary of subordinate liability or, in the words of Mettraux, as an “exclusionary 
clause”. 61 The Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), on the other hand, defines 
command responsibility in positive terms, as a separate ‘ground of criminal responsibility’. In 
the following, we will take a closer look at Article 28.  
  
4.1.1 Article 28 of the ICC Statute 
 
Article 28: Responsibility of Commanders and other Superiors 
In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this Statute for crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court: 
(a) A military commander or person effectively act ing as a military commander shall be criminally responsible 
for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her effective command and 
control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control 
properly over such forces, where:  
 (i)  That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should 
 have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes; and 
 (ii)  That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his 
 or her powers to  prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent 
 authorities for investigation and prosecution.  
(b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in paragraph (a), a superior shall be 
criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by subordinates under his or her 
effective authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such 
subordinates, where:  
 (i)  The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated, that the 
 subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes; 
 (ii)  The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility and control of the 
 superior; and 
 (iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent 
 or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and 
                                                 
61 Mettraux, supra note 12, at 25. 
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 prosecution. 
 
Article 28 deviates from the ICTY provision on a few conspicuous points. With regard to the 
actus reus it provides for three ‘countermeasures’: ‘prevent and repress’ and ‘submit to the 
proper authorities’. The first two are drawn from the wording of Articles 86 and 87 AP I, 
where the main focus is on prevention of subordinate wrongdoing with repression being a 
collateral duty of prevention. 62 At first blush, the third counter-measure seems superfluous; 
it could be brought under the second countermeasure of ‘repress’. The Pre-Trial Chamber in 
Bemba views it as an alternative when the commander does not have the power to punish:  
 
The Chamber wishes to point out that the duty to punish requiring the superior to take the necessary 
measures to sanct ion the commission of crimes may be fulfilled in two different ways: either by the superior 
himself taking the necessary and reasonable measures to punish his forces, or,  if he does not have the ability 
to do so, by referring the matter to the competent authorities. Thus, the duty to punish (as part of the duty 
to repress) constitutes an alternative to the third duty mentioned under article 28(a)(ii), namely the duty to 
submit the matter to the competent authorities, when the superior is  not himself in a position to take 
necessary and reasonable measures to punish.63 
 
One could, however, argue that ‘repress’ and ‘submit to the proper authorities’ are distinct 
in their underlying duty. Since ‘repress’, rooted in Article 86 and 87 API, is closely linked 
to the prevent-scenario, it can be seen as based on a reactive duty with regard to past 
crimes. As such it would accord with the ‘punish’ alternative in article 7(3) of the ICTY 
Statute. ‘Submitting to the competent authorities’, on the other hand, could be regarded as 
related to the future where the failure to submit to authorities is blameworthy for its 
potential to trigger future crimes (by creating a culture of lawlessness).64 Here the duty to 
report is incumbent upon the superior who exercised effective control at the time when the 
report should have been made; not necessarily at the time when the crimes were committed. 
This type of liability could be regarded as encompassing successor superior responsibility. 
The German Act implementing the ICC Statute provides for such a form of command 
responsibility; a separate offence which criminalises a failure to investigate/report 
subordinate’s crimes. 
                                                 
62 See section 2.3. 
63 Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/05-01/08) Decision pursuant to Article 61(7)(an) and (b) of the Rome 
Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre B, 15 June 2009 (hereinafter Bemba Confirmation 
Decision), para. 440. 
64 See Th. Weigend, ‘Superior Responsibility: Complicity, Omission or Over-Extension of the Criminal Law’, 
in: Ch. Burchard, O. Triffterer and J. Vogel (eds.), The Review Conference and the Future of the International 
Criminal Court, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2010, p. 67, 80, at 77. 
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 This brings us to another difference between article 7(3) and article 28: the express 
recognition of a causal link. Causality plays a peculiar role in the context of omission 
liability. To cite Weigend, “it is better to  speak of ‘hypothetical’ causation”65, given the fact 
that the superior did not actively set a causal chain in motion but remained passive. 
Hypothetical causation requires a fact-finder to determine, in hindsight, whether a certain 
consequence (subordinate wrongdoing) was objectively probable or not. While the ICTY in 
Čelebići held that superior responsibility does not require (separate) proof of a causal link 
between a superior’s failure to act and the underlying crime 66, article 28 stipulates that the 
crimes committed by subordinates are a result of the superior’s failure to exercise proper 
control over them. This wording stands at odds with the the post-crime scenario of 
submitting to the competent authorities. In Bemba, the Pre-Trial Chamber solved this 
anomaly by finding that the causality relationship is limited to a duty to prevent future 
crimes; it would be illogical to interpret article 28 otherwise. 67  
 The most striking innovation of article 28, however, is the creation of two concepts of 
command responsibility: one for military superiors and persons effectively acting as such in 
subparagraph (a), and one for non-military superiors in subparagraph (b). This innovation, 
which deviates from prior international jurisprudence, was introduced by the delegation of the 
United States to the Rome conference. The two concepts of command responsibility differ 
fundamentally on the cognitive aspect. While they both provide for an intent/knowledge 
element (‘knew’) negligence suffices for military superiors by providing for ‘should have 
known’ in article 28(a)(i). For non-military superiors there is the stricter ‘consciously 
disregarded information’ requirement, which equals a wilful blindness/recklessness test.  The 
U.S. representative who drafted the text of Article 28, stated that the “negligence standard 
was not appropriate in a civilian context and was basically contrary to the usual principles of 
criminal law responsibility”. 68 The negligence standard for a military commander, on the 
other hand, “appeared to be justified by the fact that he was in charge of an inherently lethal 
force”. 69 
                                                 
65 Weigend, supra note 64, at 76 
66 See Čelebići Judgment, supra note 8, para 399. 
67 Bemba Confirmat ion Decision, supra note 63, paras. 421-423. A low degree of causation suffices according to 
the Pre-Trial Chamber: “There is no direct causal link that needs to be established between the superior's 
omission and the crime committed by his subordinates. Therefore, the Chamber considers that it is  only 
necessary to prove that the commander's omission increased the risk of the commission of the crimes charged in 
order to hold him criminally responsible under article 28(a) o f the Statute” (para.425). 
68 U.N. Diplomat ic Conference of Plen ipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 
Summary Records of the 1st Meeting of the Committee of the Whole, U.N. Doc A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.1 (20 
November 1998), para. 67. 
69 Ibidem, para. 68. 
THE LEGACY OF THE ICTY – THREE GENERATIONS OF CASE LAW AND STILL AMBIGUITY 
 
 20 
 
The structure of article 28 is rather complex. The provision encapsulates two omissions. 
There is a general omission in the ‘chapeau’, phrased as a ‘result crime’ through the explicit 
causal link (a superior is liable when he fails “to exercise control properly” as a result of 
which crimes have been committed) and a more specific omission in subparagraphs (a)(ii) and 
(b)(ii) (he/she “failed to take all measures…to prevent or repress or submit the matter to the 
competent authorities”). Both the general/chapeau omission and the specific omission - at 
least when it concerns the element ‘knew’- need to be interpreted in accordance with article 
30 of the Statute, which contains a default rule for the mental element.   
When the commander has knowledge of the underlying crimes and fails to prevent 
these crimes, the two omissions coincide. The fact that a superior failed to prevent or repress 
crimes while he knew of them, implies that he failed to exercise control properly, which 
resulted in the commission of a crime. Here superior responsibility qualifies as a mode of 
liability (by omission) where a superior knowingly participates in subordinate’s crimes by 
failing to prevent or repress them. As such, this type of superior responsibility is closely 
related to complicity/criminal participation. 70   
 When the superior lacks knowledge and ‘should have known’, the two omissions of 
article 28 cannot be aligned in the same way. A negligent failure to intervene cannot easily be 
combined with intentional subordinate liability. Ambos refers to it as ‘a stunning 
contradiction between the negligent conduct of the superior and the underlying intent 
crimes committed by the subordinates’. 71 A way out of this illogical impasse would be to 
regard superior responsibility as a separate offence, a ‘failure to supervise’.72 Consider 
Schabas’ statement with regard to superior responsibility and the crime of genocide. 
 
Indeed, even the ICC will probab ly be requ ired, in pract ice, to treat command responsibility as a separate 
and distinct offence. In the case of genocide, fo r example, it is generally recognized that the mental element 
of the crime is one of specific intent. It is log ically impossib le to conv ict a person who is merely neg ligent 
of a crime of specific intent. Accord ing ly, the Court , if Art icle 28 o f the Statute is to have any pract ical 
effect , will be requ ired to conv ict commanders o f a crime other than genocide, and one that can only be 
negligent  superv ision  of subord inates who  commit genocide. 73 
                                                 
70 V. Nehrlich, ‘Superior Responsibility under Article 28 ICCSt : For What Exactly is the Superior Held 
Responsible? 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2007), at 672-3. 
71 K. Ambos, ‘Superior Responsibility’in A. Cassese et al. (eds.) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court : a commentary (Oxford : Oxford University Press 2002), at 852.  
72 Ibidem, at 871. 
73 W.A. Schabas, ‘Canadian implementing legislation for the Rome Statute’, 3 YIHL (2000), at 342. See also M. 
Damaška, ‘The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility’, 49 AJCL (2001), at 455 
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However, the solut ion suggested by Schabas does not comport with the text of the ICC 
Statute. After all, article 28 stipulates that the superior is “criminally responsible for crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her effective command 
(emphasis added, EvS)”. As Meloni points out, under article 28 a superior is responsible 
and punished for the principal crime. 74  
 The compromise solution would be to view negligent superior responsibility as 
generating liability for a failure to exercise control properly where the (intentional) 
subordinate crime is a point of reference that triggers liability and provides a basis for 
determining the sentence. Nehrlich formulates it somewhat differently. In his view, negligent 
superior responsibility provides for parallel liability: it regards the subordinate crime as well 
as the superior’s failure to act.75 The superior can be blamed for the subordinate’s crime as a 
wrongful consequence of his failure to act, even if it was an unintentional result of that failure 
to act.  
  
4.2 National Law 
 
According to Werle command responsibility is “an original creation of international 
criminal law”. 76 While the concept may be seen to originate from (national) military law, 
it has indeed been developed as a criminal law concept in the case law of international 
courts. With the adoption of the ICC Statute and its implementation at the national level, 
many States now provide for command responsibility in their domestic legal systems.  
 German ICC implementing legislation77 contains three provisions relating to 
command responsibility and identifies it by its nature and blameworthiness. A superior who 
intentionally (knowingly) omits to prevent the commission of crimes deserves the same 
punishment as the subordinate (article 1 para. 4(1)) and can be qualified as an accomplice, 
whereas the failure to supervise the subordinate (article 1 para. 13) and report crimes (article 1 
para. 14) are separate crimes of omission that carry more lenient sentences than intentional 
command responsibility. Here the general (chapeau) omission of a failure to supervise and the 
third countermeasure (submit to competent authorities) have been recognised as separate 
                                                 
74 Ch. Meloni, ‘Command responsibility. Mode of liability for the Crimes of Subordinates or Separate offence of 
the Superior’, Journal of International Criminal Justice (2007), at 633. 
75 Nehrlich, supra note 70, p. 682. 
76 G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press 2005), Margin No. 368. 
77 ‘Gesetz zur Einführung des Völkerstrafgesetzbuches’, 26 June 2002,  Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 2002 Teil 
II, Nr. 42, 2254. Availab le in all UN languages at <http://www.iuscrim.mpg.de/forsch/online_pu.html>. 
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omissions. 
 Similar to the German legislation, article 5 of the Canadian Crimes Against Humanity 
and War Crimes Act78 (CAHWCA) separates the pre-crime and post-crime forms of 
command responsibility into distinct provisions/subparagraphs. The Canadian provision 
qualifies command responsibility as a separate offence by referring to it as as ‘an indictable 
offence’. This approach is prompted by Canadian constitutional jurisprudence, which 
considers it contrary to principles of fundamental justice to stigmatise a person with a 
conviction for a serious crime like murder or rape where the mental element is one of 
negligence. 79  
 On the basis of article 9(1) of the Dutch International Crimes Act80 a superior is 
culpable when he/she “(a) intentionally permits the commission of such an offence by a 
subordinate; or (b) intentionally fails to take measures, in so far as these are necessary and can 
be expected of him, if one of his subordinates has committed or intends to commit such an 
offence”. Proof of actual knowledge is required for liability under article 9(1)(a) and of 
constructive knowledge (‘must have known’) under article 9(1)(b). Section 9(2), on the other 
hand, provides for command responsibility as a negligent dereliction of duty. It is formulated 
as a separate offence, which carries a lower sentence than the underlying (subordinate) 
offence:  
 
Anyone who culpably neglects to take measures, in so far as these are necessary and can be expected of him, 
where he has reasonable grounds for suspecting that a subordinate has committed or intends to commit such an 
offence, shall be liable to no more than two-thirds of the maximum of the principal sentences prescribed for the 
offences referred to in para. 2.  
 
Section 65 of the UK International Criminal Court Act 2001 almost verbatim incorporates 
article 28 of the ICC Statute to which it adds in paragraph 4: “A person responsible under this 
section for an offence is regarded as aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the 
commission of the offence”. 81 This is a clear deviation from the provision in the Draft ICC 
Bill that had provided in section 48(4) that “A person responsible under this section for an 
                                                 
78 Act 29 June 2000 <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/icc/crimes-en.asp. 
79 See W.A. Schabas, ‘Canadian Implementing Legislat ion for the Rome Statute’, in 3 YIHL (2000), p. 342. 
80 Act of 9 June 2003, Stb 2003, 270. English translation:   
<http://www.iccnow.org/resourcestools/ratimptoolkit/nationalregionaltools/legislationdebates/NL.IntCrAct.doc>
For a more elaborate analysis of the ICA: H. Bevers et al., 'The Dutch International Crimes Act', in M. Neuner 
(ed.), National legislation incorporating international crimes (Berlin, BW V-Berliner Wissenschafts-
Verlag/Wolf Legal Publishers 2003), pp. 179-197.  
81 <http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010017.htm> 
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offence is liable to be proceeded against and punished as a principal offender (empasis added, 
EvS)”.82 In effect, the Act converted the superior from principal to accessory. This can be 
taken as an indication that the concept of command responsibility was not readily 
recognisable as accomplice liability. 83 
 Noteworthy are the provisions on command responsibility in U.S. military law. 
Paragraph 5-1 of the Field-Manual 27-10 (FM 27-10) of the US Army Manual, provides for 
negligence liability: 
 
The commander is (…) responsible if he has actual knowledge or should have knowledge, through reports 
received by him or through other means, that troops or other persons subject to his control are about to commit 
or have committed a war crime and he fails to take the necessary and reasonable steps to insure compliance with 
the law of war or to punish violators thereof.84 
 
Article 77 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) - that unlike FM 27-10 does not 
apply to enemy nationals - is much stricter. A superior is punishable “as principle” when he 
“commits an offense...or aids, abets, counsels, commands or procures its commission” or 
when he “causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him”.85 Comparing 
paragraph 5-1 of FM 27-10 to Article 77 UCMJ, it is clear that the latter requires positive 
personal participation, which implies actual knowledge of the crimes committed by 
subordinates. In fact, the Manual for Courts-Martial, which reads as a Commentary to the 
UCMJ, explains that a “mere failure to prevent the commission of an offense” is not enough 
to create culpability; “there must be an intent to aid or encourage the persons who commit the 
crime”.86 Article 77 UCMJ penalises encouragement through inaction and qualifies it as 
complicity. Deviating from classic complicity law, however, the superior who is held liable 
under 77 UCMJ is considered a principal rather than a secondary party. 87  
 
 
5. Command Responsibility: a multilayered concept 
                                                 
82 <http://www.parliament.uk>  
83 See also R. May and S. Powles, 'Command responsibility: a new basis of criminal liability in English law?', 
Criminal Law Review (2002), 363-378.  
84 US Department of the Army, Field Manual 27-10: The Law of Land Warfare (1956) (FM 27-10), para. 501. 
85 The relevant edition of the UCMJ during the Medina court-mart ial was the 1969 U.S. Manual for Courts-
Martial, app.2 (1969).  
86 1969 U.S. Manual for Courts-Martial, R.C.M. 307(2) (1969), paras. 28-4 and 28-5. 
87 A superior, according to Anglo-American complicity law, is a secondary party to the crime. The crime is 
committed by the principal/physical perpetrator who direct ly causes the actus reus of the crime. Medina, fo r 
instance, was prosecuted as a principal. 
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The overview goes to show that there is a wide variety of liability concepts that can be 
referred to as command responsibility. First of all, command responsibility as criminal 
participation/complicity requiring actual knowledge and intent (article 1(4) of the German 
ICC Act, article 9(1) of the Dutch ICC Act, and intentional (‘knew’) pre-crime command 
responsibility in article 28 ICC Statute). Secondly, command responsibility as criminal 
participation based on a negligence standard (FM 27-10, UK ICC Act 2001, negligent 
(‘should have known’) command responsibility in article 28 ICC Statute). This type of 
liability is conceptually akward for allowing a superior to be held accountable for intentional 
crimes on the basis of a negligent failure to supervise. Hence the technique in domestic law of 
formulating command responsibility as a separate offence ( articles 1(13) and 1(14) of the 
German ICC Act, article 9(2) of the Dutch ICC Act, and section 5 of Canadian ICC 
implementing legislation). A subdivision can be made between those jurisdictions that 
provide for negligent command responsibility as a separate offence whilst imposing a lower 
sentence than the (intentional) principal crime (German and Dutch legislation) and those that 
do not provide for a more lenient sentence (Canadian legislation). A third type of command 
responsibility can be discerned when distinguishing between a reactive and a prospective duty 
to supervise. The former is the ‘classic’ type of command responsibility, based on article 86 
and 87 API, the latter can be taken from the clause ‘submitting the matter to the competent 
authorities’ in article 28 of the ICC Statute. It has been implemented as a separate offence in 
art. 1  para. 14 of the German ICC Act.  
  
What the overview of command responsibility beyond the ICTY framework makes 
patently clear, is that command responsibility consists of various layers; it encapsulates 
distinct forms of liability. This becomes most apparent when examining how article 28 
has been implemented in domestic legal systems. The German, Dutch and Canadian 
legislatures have compartmentalized the provis ion into segments of criminal responsibility, 
most particularly by criminalizing the specific omissions in subparagraphs 28(a)(ii) and 
28(b)(ii) as self-standing omissions. This technique, that has been referred to by Triffterer as  
the ‘splitting solution’, may be welcomed for reasons of clarity and coherence.88 ‘Splitting’ 
happens on two levels: on a factual/temporal level and on a moral/fault degree level. The pre-
crime and post-crime scenarios are distinguished and criminalized separately as are the 
                                                 
88 Triffterer (2002), p. 190. See also M. Neuner, 'General Princip les of International Criminal Law in Germany', 
in Neuner, supra note 80, pp. 126-135. 
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intentional and negligent forms of superior responsibility. The latter is particularly relevant 
for Dutch and German law where lesser penalties express the lower moral responsibility that 
attaches to negligence as a fault degree. 
  
Another lesson that can be drawn from the overview of national and international concepts of 
command responsibility, concerns the nature of superior responsibility. By codifying 
command responsibility as a separate offence of negligence, national legislatures have found 
an elegant solution to the incoherence of negligent liability for intentional crimes.  
It is noteworthy that command responsibility is difficult to characterize in terms of 
national criminal law theories. Command responsibility does not readily fit the classic model 
of Anglo-American complicity law where the superior is an acomplice who participates in the 
subordinate/principal’s crime. In deviating from complicity law, article 77 of the UCMJ 
specifically refers to a superior as ‘principal’ as did the UK ICC Bill (that was later changed 
back to classic complicity terminology).  
 
 
6. Command Responsibility as Parallel Liability  
 
Returning to the question of the nature of command responsibility in the ICTY context, the 
picture becomes clearer, especially when we compare article 7(3) to article 28 of the ICC 
Statute. Superior/command responsibility is most unproblematic, in an intentional (‘knew’) 
pre-crime variant. As such it easily fits the complicity format and qualifies as a mode of 
liability. It fits the complex wording of article 28, with its two omissions and an explicit 
element of causation. Also at the ICTY, this form of command responsibility fits the wording 
of 7(3) and the interpretation in case law, especially the first generation cases. 
Given the gap that exists between superior and subordinate liability on the fault degree 
(negligence versus intent) negligent command  responsibility in article 28, cannot qualify as 
complicity or criminal participation. It can be best regarded as a separate offence of a failure 
to supervise. The text of article 28, however, does not allow a separate offence interpretation 
since it stipulates that superiors are ‘criminally responsible for the crimes ..committed by 
forces’ under their effective command and control. In an attempt to maintain a separate 
offence reading, the compromise would be to view post-crime superior responsibility as 
parallel liability where the superior is blamed for the subordinate’s crime as a wrongful 
consequence of his failure to act.  
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 Article 7(3) does not provide for a negligence/‘should have known’ variant of superior 
responsibility, although one could argue that ‘had reason to know’ comes very close to the 
negligence form of command responsibility of article 28. 89 The problem of incoherence, of 
combining a negligent failure to an intentional underlying crime, therefore, does not arise in 
the ICTY context in the way as it does at the ICC. The need to recognise command 
responsibility as a separate offence may, therefore, not be as pertinent at the ICTY as it is at 
the ICC.  
Having said that, as a result of a broad interpretation of words such as ‘commission’ 
and ‘subordinate’ in article 7(3), there also exists a gap at the ICTY between superior and 
subordinate liability. The superior and subordinate relationship, an important element of 
command responsibility, has been loosened, which makes attribution of subordinate’s crimes 
to the superior difficult. It is against that background that we must understand the attempt of 
the Hadžihasanović Trial Chamber to interpret article 7(3) as a separate offence (failure to 
supervise) which carries a lower sentence than the principal/underlying crime.  
 
The previous leads to two observations. First of all, command responsibility can be 
detached from subordinate liability in two ways: (i) through lack of knowledge/intent on 
the part of the superior (‘should have known’) and (ii) by way of loosening the superior-
subordinate relationship (through a broad reading of ‘commission’ or ‘subordinate’).90 
The first two form of command responsibility relate to the ICC context; the second to the 
ICTY context. Secondly, neither in international statutory nor in international case- law, is 
command responsibility formulated and recognised as a separate offence. 
The nature of command responsibility at both the ICC and the ICTY can be best 
characterized as parallel liability. As such, command responsibility has traits of both a 
separate offence and criminal participation. As such it captures the mode of liability variant as  
parallels of subordinate and superior responsibility that coincide. In the separate offence 
format, on the other hand, the parallels stay apart  but they come together in the sentence. The 
qualification of ‘parallel liability’, used by Nehrlich in the ICC context, also accords with 
ICTY law. We are reminded of the ICTY Appeals Chamber ruling in Hadžihasanović where 
                                                 
89 See Weigend, supra note 65, at 78. 
90 One could identify a third way: by regard ing command responsibility as premised on  a duty to p revent 
future crimes; where a successor-superio r fails to submit  the matter to competent authorit ies. The 3rd fo rm 
of actus reus or countermeasure in art icle 28 o f the ICC Statute cou ld be v iewed as such (and has been 
viewed  as such by nat ional leg is latu res). ‘Submitt ing to the competent authorit ies’ would  then not be 
regarded as an alternat ive  for ‘repress’, as was suggested by the Pre-Trial Chamber in Bemba (Bemba 
Confirmat ion Decis ion, para. 440) but as a separate failu re to punish based on a prospective duty. See 
further sect ion 4.1   
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it was held that under article 7(3) both the gravity of the underlying crime as well as the 
superior’s own conduct count towards the sentence. 91  
 
 
7.  Evolving Liability 
 
Having determined that command responsibility in the context of ICTY law can be 
characterized as parallel liability, and having described how the parallel tracks have widened 
through the broad interpretation of article 7(3), the question arises how the tracks can be kept 
together to prevent command responsibility from straying into a form of collective 
responsibility. One way of preventing a (further) broadening of command responsibility 
beyond the limits of personal culpability, would be to bolster the knowledge element. Instead 
of a broad ‘had reason to know’ requirement 92 it would have to be proved that the superior 
knew of the subordinate’s conduct/acts, which includes his/her participation in crimes. A 
positive knowledge requirement could compensate for a remote linkage between superiors 
and the underlying crimes. Thus, in case of command responsibility for crimes committed by 
anonymous perpetrators in which the subordinate participated, it would have to be shown that 
alongside effective control over the subordinate, the commander knew that his/her 
subordinate was about to become, or had been, involved in such crimes. Insisting on a strict 
mens rea/knowledge element can be regarded as maintaining a balance between the three 
elements underlying the theory of command responsibility. Broadening the superior-
subordinate relationship means narrowing the knowledge element. There is a hydraulic 
relationship between the elements, which in Čelebići had equal weight. 
How to view command responsibility as a basis for sentencing a superior for crimes 
that a subordinate participated in rather than commit him/herself? In my view a sentencing 
discount is appropriate when there is a very lose connection to the underlying crime. As with 
negligent superior responsibility, moral blameworthiness lies first and foremost in a 
superior’s (own) failure to prevent or punish/repress. Such omission liability is generally less 
worthy of punishment than the underlying crime.  
Regarding superior responsibility as parallel liability is helpful in constructing a 
sentencing discount. We do not need to interpret superior responsibility at the ICTY as a 
                                                 
91 See supra note 58 
92 Where “sufficiently alarming information putting a superior on notice of the risk that crimes might 
subsequently be carried out by his subordinates and justifying further inquiry is sufficient to hold a superior 
liab le under Article 7(3) of the Statute”, Judgement, Prosecutor v. Strugar (IT-01-42 A), 17 July 2008, para.304.   
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separate offence to justify a reduced sentence, as the Trial Chamber did in Hadžihasanović. 
The subordinate’s offence can be taken as point of reference and a certain portion can be 
deduced from the sentence that would attach to the principal crime.  
 
 
8. Concluding observations 
 
Looking back on a decade of ICTY case law on command responsibility starting with 
Čelebići, and evaluating the Tribunal’s legacy with respect to this liability theory, one has  
to conclude that ICTY jurisprudence has been instrumental in developing this concept. Its 
case law stood at the basis of Article 28 of the ICC Statute. In creating a basic model of 
command responsibility, entrenched in the three underlying principles identified in 
Čelebići, the Tribunal has done international criminal law a service. It is to be expected that 
ICTY case law will remain relevant long after the Tribunal closes its doors, if only 
because unlike other liability theories (aiding/abetting, instigation), command 
responsibility is truly an international law construct that has been given substance for the 
first time by the ICTY. One cannot rely on national law to fill gaps and further develop 
the law. 
 This is not to say that ICTY case law has no flaws and that other courts should 
follow it uncritically. Command responsibility is one of the most complex liability 
theories in international law. Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute, and the case law that 
ensues from it do not do justice to the complexities of this liability theory. Moreover, its 
nature remains ambiguous and subject to debate. This is for a large part down to the text 
of the provision in the ICTY Statute, which in its one-dimensional - mode of liability -
wording incapable of providing for a separate offence interpretation.  
 
 
* * * 
